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I. INTRODUCTION
In the Global Partnership Plan of Action signed in January 1992,'
President George Bush and Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa came to a
fundamental agreement. The United States promised to ensure that the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFrA)2 would enhance
global free trade, in accordance with basic principles of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATr),3 and would not lead to the
erection of trade barriers for countries outside of the North American
market.4 However, without evidence that Japan is opening its markets
to North American and European companies, there is little likelihood
that President Bush will actually pursue these goals in the face of
domestic pressures to adopt more protective trade measures directed at
Japan.5 These pressures have mounted over the past ten years, as the
United States trade deficit with Japan remains large, while its deficit with
Europe has disappeared.6 At the same time, the Japanese have refused
to respond to pressure,7 initiated by corporate and political leaders in
the United States,' to reform their business practices to correspond to
those followed in North America and Europe.9 This refusal, along with
* Fulbright Lecturer, Kobe University Faculty of Law; Adjunct Professor of Law, Duke
University School of Law. A.B., 1970, Hamilton College; J.D., 1974, Harvard Law School.
1. Text of U.S.-Japan Global Partnership Plan of Action, JAPAN TIMES, Jan. 11, 1992, at 3.
2. See Joint Statement Announcing Canada-Mexico-United States Trilateral Free Trade
Negotiations, 27 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 133 (Feb. 5, 1991).
3. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, openedfor signature Oct. 30,1947,61 Stat. A3,
55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT].
4. Text of U.S.-Japan Global Partnership Plan of Action, supra note 1, at 3.
5. Congress Told to Retaliate on Investor Discrimination, MAINICHI DAILY NEWS, Jan. 24,
1992, at 7, 8; US Congressmen Favor Trade Imbalance Retaliation, MAINICHI DAILY NEWS, Nov. 11,
1991, at 1; Yoshikuni Sugiyama, Anti-Japan Car Bills Submitted in U.S., DAILY YoMIIJRU, Jan. 24,
1992, at 16.
6. Jim Mann, Bush's Tour Reflects New Realities in U.S.-Asia Ties, L.A. TIES, Jan.11, 1992,
at 7, 8.
7. J. Douglas Johnson, Japan Won't be Remade, Amnerican-Style, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 18,1991,
at 7. Tadao Chino, Japan's Vice Minister of Finance, said Japan will remain "'defiantly
independent from the United States."' Id.
8. "'The Japanese must change their systems of competition and change.., to bring
them into material alignment in all respects with those in North America and those in Europe.'"
Id. (quoting Joseph T. Gorman, Chairman of TRW Inc.).
9. An example of this discrepancy is found:
when [U.S.] and Japanese product prices are individually analyzed .... [This
analysis points] to substantial trade barriers in Japan that adversely affect only
foreign products. Prices for the same U.S. or European products are about 65 percent
higher in Japan than in the United States. For example, a U.S. made laser printer
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the ever-increasing trade disparity between Japan and the United States,
raises the distinct possibility that NAFTA will provide for trade
measures that violate antidiscrimination GATT principles.
Given Japan's reluctance to make concessions in the Uruguay Round
of negotiations, ° Japanese government officials and company
executives are preparing for this possibility and are beginning to lodge
protests against potential GATT violations that might arise from the
consummation of a North American free trade agreement. Yasuo
Tanabe, the director of the North American Trade Planning section of
Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), has
challenged NAFTA as a "threat to the international trade system." 1
Criticism such as this is unusual, yet it reflects a reaction to pressure
exerted by the United States and Canada on the creation of the fifteen
nation Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation group (APEC)," and their
desire for APEC to take a different course than that of NAFTA or the
European Community (EC). 3 Consequently, the Japanese are
somewhat mistrustful of the intentions of the United States and Canada
due to the apparent hypocrisy.14
Despite these criticisms and the apparent Japanese reaction against
the formation of a North American free trade zone, Japanese opposition
may not be as strong as it appears, as the Japanese have done very little
to ameliorate the potential divisive situation that is evolving. Japan,
costs $449 in the United States, but more than $825 in Japan....
But prices for Japanese products sold in the United States or Europe are almost
exactly the same as in Japan. For example, a Japanese camera that sells for $555 in
the United States costs $578 in Japan. The Japanese-made film costs $3.50 in the
United States, $3.25 in Japan.
Virtually none of these products were subject to tariffs. Transportation costs,
which should normally raise the cost of goods in foreign markets by about 5 percent
to 15 percent, were not factors, either. This strongly suggests that nontariff trade
barriers are the reason why foreign product prices are strikingly higher in Japan..
Another favored explanation is that Japan's inefficient distribution system drives
up prices of both foreign and domestic products.... [T]he system is especially
inefficient-and thus a trade barrier-only for imports.
David Friedman & Loren Yager, U.S. Autos: On the Road to Nowhere, DAILY YOMIURI, Jan. 12,
1992, at 7.
10. Michio Sato & Yoshikuni Sugiyama, Summit Seen Opening Era of Managed Trade, DAILY
YOMiURI, Jan. 11, 1992, at 16. Japans position on trade barriers on rice is a notable example of
its reluctance to concede on GATT issues. Id.
11. Edith Terry, North American Free Trade Concerns Japanese, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto),
Nov. 11, 1991, at B3.
12. APEC is "a new regional economic organization whose membership includes the
United States, Japan and 13 other nations on both sides of the Pacific." Mann, supra note 6, at
8.
13. Terry, supra note 11, at B3.
14. Id.
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although acknowledging through its Economic Planning Agency (EPA)
that "free trade zones would be discouraged from becoming economic
blocs if GATr were to operate more effectively and thereby impart
confidence in the free trade system," 5 refuses to make concessions
which would facilitate compliance by the United States, Canada, and
Mexico with GAIT.'6 Furthermore, Japanese leaders recognize that
changing their business practices and opening their markets to the West
could lead to a less restrictive free trade agreement, yet they consistently
refuse to comply with these demands." These same leaders must also
be aware of the recent conclusions of the EPA that the growth of
regional trade agreements could signal a shrinkage of world trade. 8
Japanese intransigence may result from the belief that concessions are
unnecessary, as Japan may actually derive a long-term benefit from
NAFTA. Japanese companies are financially strong enough to invest
directly in North America and counter local content requirements 9 in
a restrictive trade agreement. Japan would then develop economic
hegemony over Asian nations with limited access to the North American
market.
II. NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
Japanese lobbyists and trade organizations are already mounting a
coordinated campaign to minimize the negative impact of NAFTA on
Japanese companies and their North American operations. In meetings
with the Mexican Ministry of Commerce and Industry, the NIKKEI
Enterprise Group' argued that the local content requirement should be
lower in Mexico because its industrial power is less than that of the
United States and Canada; the group urged Mexico to consider both its
role and responsibilities as a Pacific Rim country.2' As Korean
15. ECONOMIC PLANNING AGENCY, GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN, THE JAPANESE PERSPECrIVE ON
THE WORLD ECONOMY 1991 (SUMMARY) 35 (1992).
16. Editorial, Take Initiative on Rice Issues, DAILY YOMIURI, Jan. 12, 1992, at 6.
17. Japanese Fearful of Regional Trade Blocs, WORLD TRADE NEWS, Dec. 4, 1991, at 7.
18. Id.
19. See infra notes 26-32 and accompanying text.
20. The NIKKEI Enterprise Group represents twenty-five Japanese companies with
investments in and near Tijuana, Mexico who oppose Mexico's participation in NAFTA under
the terms proposed by the United States..
21. NAFTA ni taisuru nikkei kigya no yObT, JETRO, Dec. 6, 1991, at 1. The Japanese
Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Mexico surveyed its member companies on NAFTA
and its impact. More than 70 percent of the companies thought that NAFTA was needed for
Mexico, but more than 90 percent thought that NAFTA might create an economic trading block.
Trading companies and manufacturers thought that NAFTA would increase business
opportunities by enlarging the Mexican domestic market and opening a door to the American
market. However, these same companies were worried that NAFTA might have a negative
impact on trade between Mexico and Japan, particularly concerning local content requirements.
Kaigai Kara no HOkoku: NAFTA kusho wo niramu nikei makiradera kigyJ (Mekishiko Sentf), JETRO
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businessman Lee Hahn-Koo noted, reflecting the thoughts of many
Japanese as well, "'the success of the Mexican economy will depend to
a large extent on' how the NAFTA talks progress, since 'the more
protectionism there is, the less attractive Mexico will be"' to Asian
investors.'
Mr. Tanabe of MITI argued similarly that Canada might offend its
Asian partners by giving priority to NAFTA and, during Canadian
Trade and Industry Minister Michael Wilson's 1991 visit to Japan,
specifically stated that, "'[ilf Canada spends too much time on the
eastern side of the Pacific, there is a danger that countries on the western
side will be angry with it."' Mr. Toshio Kunii, chairman of the Japan
Automobile Manufacturers' Association of Canada, said that the
imposition of NAFTA with high North American manufactured parts
content requirements on automobiles would lead Japanese automobile
manufacturing companies to decrease investment in Canada.24 He
added that it would be in Canada's best interest to oppose an increase
from the current 50 percent local content level which is required to
achieve duty-free status, as the United States-Canada Free Trade
Agreement dictates.'
Under the current agreement between the United States and Canada,
automobiles assembled in one of the two countries and shipped to the
other are exempt from tariffs if at least half their content comes from
either, or both, countries.' Automobile and electronic company
executives are pressing for a local content requirement in NAFTA similar
in style to the one found in the free trade agreement with Canada, as
they are worried that Japan may attempt to expand its use of Mexico as
an export door to the United States. It is feared that these industries
will be unable to compete with Japanese manufacturers in Mexico unless
the agreement imposes "tight restrictions on the definition of what
SENSOR, Aug. 1991, at 121-22.
22. Eduardo Garcia-Aquilar, Asia's Interest in Mexico Overshadowed by Proposed Free Trade
Accord, Agence France Press, Nov. 24, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wire File.
23. Terry, supra note 11, at B3.
24. General Developments, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 44, at 1633 (Nov. 6, 1991).
25. Id. On December 5, 1991, the Japanese Consulate General in Toronto announced the
findings of a survey of the thirty leading Japanese business firms in Toronto on NAFTA. The
firms linked the decline of international competitiveness in Canada's industrial sector with the
reduction in business opportunities for Japanese companies in Canada. They attributed this
decline to high wages, the taxation system, and low enthusiasm for research and development.
Most companies agreed that NAFTA may open up the Canadian market in the short-term and
provide a constructive adjustment of Canadian industry in the mid to long run. Kanada no
kyosoryoku teika nikkei kigyu mo shinpai - Toronto sorytjikan ga che'sa, JUT PRESS (Toronto Branch
Office), Dec. 5, 1991, at 50.
26. United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act of 1988, Pub L. No.
100-449, § 202, 102 Stat. 1851, 1856 (1988).
27. Bruce Stokes, Export Platform, 1991 NAT'L J. 1258.
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makes a product 'Made in Mexico'. " 2' United States and Canadian
automobile and automobile parts companies are calling for even higher
local content requirements than the current 50 percent, in the range of 60
to 75 percent local content, for foreign, particularly Japanese,
"transplant" automobile assemblers to be allowed to obtain duty free
entry of parts into Canada.' "Higher local content standards would
force Japanese auto makers [either] to upgrade their North American
factories, costing billions of dollars,"' ° or to purchase automobile parts
from North American suppliers. Japanese companies and the Japanese
government are clearly concerned about this potential outcome and are
closely monitoring the current situation between the United States,
Canada, and Mexico.3'
Nonetheless, many Japanese industries have the financial strength to
continue to invest directly in North America, while the rewards of these
investments will flow back to Japan due to the establishment of the
keiretsu system in North America.32 Thus, even a higher local content
requirement will not be entirely successful at limiting Japanese access to
the North American market.
Japanese automobile manufacturers have discretely encouraged
Japanese automobile parts manufacturers to open plants in the United
States where the establishment and success of the keiretsu system has
already become evident.' For instance, a Honda plant in Ohio has
been buying parts from its keiretsu affiliated Japanese parts
manufacturers without utilizing an open and fair bidding process on the
basis of quality and price.O Given the keiretsu affiliation, it is doubtful
28. Garcia-Aquilar, supra note 22.
29. General Developments, supra note 24, at 1633. "General Motors of Canada Ltd. has
proposed a 60 percent rule, Ford Motor Co. and Chrysler Ltd. a 70 percent rule and the
Canadian part industry a 75 percent rule of origin." Id.
30. Terry, supra note 11, at B3.
31. See Beika kyatei no hyoika narabe ni kyotei hakkago no kigyo senryaku, JETRO (Foreign
Economic Information Center), 90-REA, 719-1541, Mar. 1991, at 54-61.
32. The keiretsu system permits the functionally integrated corporate groups "to capture
economies of scale and exploit industrial linkages as a group." TERUTOMO OZAWA,
MULTINATIONALISM JAPANESE STYLE 66 (1979). The five major trading companies, Mitsubishi,
Mitsui, Marubeni, C. Itoh, and Sumitomo, head such corporate keiretsu groups. Corporate
group companies tend to do business with each other. There are interlocking boards of
directors and corporate shareholding between companies in the same group.
33. There is little direct evidence of such encouragement, as the Japanese are well aware
that the United States would protest vehemently if knowledge of such actions were brought to
its attention.
34. Robert Pear, U.S. Says Honda Skirted Customs Fees, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 1991, at D6.
'Of approximately $775 of materials or parts for the [Honda] engine assembled in
Ohio,... only three parts ($9.06) and $42.69 of raw materials are sourced from U.S.-
based companies that do not have an equity relationship with Honda.' ...
The engines are important because they account for a substantial portion of the
materials Honda listed as originating in North America to satisfy the 50 percent local
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that even a high local content requirement by itself assists the
competitive position of United States automobile manufacturers and
parts suppliers. At best, there will be short-term improvement while the
Japanese automobile companies and parts manufacturers increase their
investments in the United States.
Japanese automobile companies have also transplanted the keiretsu
system to Mexico; these manufacturers understand the advantage that
manufacturing in low cost nations can provide in penetrating foreign
ma'kets. The Japanese companies export components to Mexico
which are then assembled by low paid Mexican workers. The resulting
products are exported to the United States with a label indicating that
they are officially Mexican products.36 For instance, Japanese
electronics companies in Mexico export over four million televisions to
the United States each year.' Anticipating that NAFTA will be
effective in 1992 or 1993, Nissan-Mexico has planned to increase its
automobile production by renovating its three existing manufacturing
plants and constructing a new automobile assembly plant by 1993.'
Nissan-Japan is encouraging its keiretsu automobile parts manufacturers
to invest in Mexico.39 Mr. Harley Shaiken, associate professor at the
University of California at San Diego, confirming the concerns of United
States automobile executives, suggests that Japan could exploit NAFTA
to its competitive advantage by using Mexico as a high technology
export door into the United States and Canada." To date, "only 70 of
content rule.
Id. (quoting the United States Custom Service Auditors Report on Honda). Most of these parts
are provided by Honda's keiretsu affiliated companies. Id.
35. One of these advantages is the avoidance of U.S. tariffs by investing in so-called
maquiladora industries located in a zone along the U.S.-Mexican border. "A maquiladora is a
Mexican processing or assembly plant that receives raw materials and component parts from
a foreign corporation free of import duties. Workers at the plant then assemble the goods into
finished products to be exported with a tax levied only on the value added in Mexico.... The
maquiladora system also lures manufacturing firms away from Asia and into Mexico, where they
can take advantage of relaxed tariffs." Michael Scott Feeley & Elizabeth Knier, Environmental
Cosiderations of the Emerging United States-Mexico Free Trade Agreement, 2 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L
L. 257, 273-74 (1992). .
36. Garcia-Aquilar, supra note 22.
37. Remarks by U.S. Senator John McCain (R-AZ), Fed. News Serv., Nov. 14, 1991, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
38. Nissan to Boost Mexican Output, Japanese Econ. Newswire, Sept. 19, 1991, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
39. The Mexican Embassy in Japan sponsored a seminar in June 1990 for companies
considering investments in Mexico. The seminar was conducted by Mexico's Minister of
Commerce and Industry and two company executives of Nissan-Mexico. Representatives from
Japanese automobile parts manufacturers who have business relationships with Nissan-Mexico
attended this seminar. Nissan: mekishiko de no seisan kyuka; beimuke yushutsu ni shojun; hinshitsu
kaizen he no buhinkyokya seibi, NnKEI SANGYO SHIMBUN, Oct. 11, 1991, at 11. See also H. Tanaka,
Hokubei jiya boeki kyotei; ikigai sannya no sabetsu wa keikai; beikame ni zeseiyokya; seifui gensanchi
kisekoka no ugoki, NIKEI SANGYo SHIMBuN, Oct. 8, 1991, at 1.
40. Stokes, supra note 27, at 1258.
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the 1,924 maquiladora plants along the U.S.-Mexican border [are]
Japanese-owned."4 Great Britain and Germany have greater
investments in these so-called maquiladora plants,4 but the Japanese
companies pose a more long-term competitive threat with their ability
to use Mexican workers in high technology jobs.'
The competitive advantage of the Japanese is derived in the long run
from the use of highly efficient, Japanese designed production processes,
and not only from low-cost Mexican labor and the importation of parts
from Japan, suggests Shaiken.4  Unless United States companies
prepare to respond in kind to Japan's commitment, local content
requirements provide only a short-term boost to their competitiveness
and it may be Japanese companies that ultimately prosper from
NAFTA.
A recent report published by the Economic Strategy Institute in
Washington, D.C. supports Professor Shaiken's views. It concludes that
the business and trade environments in the United States and Japan are
so structurally, institutionally, and culturally different, to Japan's
advantage, that it is imVossible for United States automobile
manufacturers to compete. The basic framework, institutions, and
business practices of Japanese society are, obviously, beyond the means
and legal jurisdiction of the United States to change. According to Ichira
Kataoka, leader of Japan's Office of Trade Ombudsman and Dean of
Osaka's Ryutsuu Kagaku University, "'there aren't any areas in Japan
where keiretsu doesn't exist,'" and keiretsu will not be dismantled by




44. Id. The results of Japanese companies' willingness to use their most advanced
technology and manufacturing techniques in their Mexican plants are evident.
The Ford Motor Co. automobile assembly plant in Hermosillo, Mexico, built with
Mazda Motor Corp., using Japanese equipment and largely Japanese parts and with
a fifth of the work force trained in Japan, has higher productivity and better quality
than any U.S.-owned facility in Mexico. Furthermore, it ranks higher than many
U.S.-based assembly lines.
Id.
45. 'Car Transplants' Called Drain on U.S. Economy, JAPAN TIMES, Jan. 7, 1992, at 1
(discussing ECONOMIC STRATEGY INSTITIT, THE CASE FOR SAVING DETROIT (1992)). Of the
automobiles displaced by the current Japanese domestic U.S. production (1.9 million units), 70
percent were U.S. domestic models and 30 percent were foreign car imports. Because so many
parts of the domestically assembled Japanese automobiles are imported, there is a net loss of
83,201 jobs per million of the American population, the difference between jobs provided by
the Japanese transplants (41,154 jobs per million population) and the loss of jobs resulting from
the displacement of domestic automobile production (124,355 jobs per million population). Id.
46. Ronald E. Yates, U.S. Companies Should Direct Gaze Inward, MAINICHI DAILY NEWS,
Nov. 11, 1991, at 2.
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Finance, "promised to use Japanese foreign aid to facilitate the
globalization of corporate Japan, [and] to remain unyielding to United
States demands that Japan change its keiretsu corporate conglomerates.
...'47 Vice Minister Chino is stating what has been obvious for years
to scholars studying Japanese culture. Japan will not be made over in
the image of the United States.
I. FEASIBILITY OF A JAPAN-LED SOUTHEAST ASIAN TRADE
BLOC
Japan's potential to benefit from NAFTA extends beyond the gains
it may receive from direct investment in North America. Japan is
positioned to lead an Asian trade bloc with restricted trading access to
North America.
The feasibility of a Japanese-led Asian trade bloc once seemed
remote. After World War I1, Japan refrained from asserting itself in an
Asian-Pacific regional leadership role to avoid criticism from its Asian
neighbors that it was returning to its pre-War imperialist ambitions.
Japan forged a special economic relationship with the United States and
focused on global, as opposed to regional, economic development.
However, the recent economic and political integration in the EC, and
the prospect of NAFTA, has reawakened Japanese interest in an Asian-
Pacific regional economic strategy which might exclude the NAFTA
nations.
Changing world politics have decreased Japan's reliance on the
United States. The disappearance of the Soviet threat has severely
weakened the bonds that strengthened the mutual security relationship
between the two countries. Furthermore, the prospect of a United States
military disengagement in Southeast Asia, the need to assist China, and
the disintegration of the Soviet Union have spurred Asian states to
become more responsible regional players.49 Japan, with the region's
biggest coffers, could take advantage of this situation and advance
toward bolder Asian-Pacific leadership in the economic and political
arena. As Asian-Pacific nations obtain capital, technology, and skills,
Japan gains access to low-cost labor for its transplanted companies in
addition to new markets for its products.5' Japanese companies,
recognizing both future business opportunities and needs, have thus
47. J. Douglas Johnson, Candor Needed to Save U.S.-Japan Relations, JAPAN TIMES, Sept. 22,
1991, at 19.
48. Yoichi Funabashi, Japan and the New World Order, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Winter 1991, at
58, 65.
49. Id. at 66.
50. Arthur Zich, Japan's Sun Rises over the Pacic, NAV'L GEOGRAPHIC, Nov. 1991, at 36,
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increased their investment throughout Asia."1 An influential Japanese
business leader, Yotaro Kobayashi, proposes "that Japan should find its
'home' in Asia, in the same way that... Russia should find its [home]
in Europe."' He further has suggested that "Japan explore the
possibility of playing a role as regional "co-chairman' with China."'
Concurrently, the seven nations of South Asia" seek to "deepen
their relationship with Japan."' Japan shares some cultural affinities
with these nations and lacks historical animosities that have affected its
political and economic relations with other Asian nations. Asian victims
of Japanese aggression during World War I are diminishing in number
and thus decreasing the impediment to much cooperation with Japan by
those who still view it as a closet militarist that could rise again.
Although many Asians still worry that Japan is seeking economic
domination rather than cooperation, the yen is universally welcome
as an economic savior by its Asian neighbors and Japan is the leading
investor, trading partner, and foreign aid donor in the region." Asian
nations seek to emulate Japanese management and organizational
techniques. If the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)59
and South Asian nations see the future viability of their economies as
dependent on Japan, they will look to Japan for leadership in the
creation of any future free trade zone.
51. Such enterprises include the building of industrial parks around Kuala Lumpur in
Malaysia. Id. at 43. "[I]n 1989, Japan invested 1.2 billion dollars in Thailand, more than it had
in the previous 35 years combined. Some 30,000 Japanese, representing more than 900 Japanese
companies" brought over 300,000 jobs and a ten percent average economic growth to Thailand.
Id. at 55. Between 1985 and 1990, Japanese investment in Australia grew from eleven billion
dollars to thirty-two billion dollars. Id. at 58.
52. Funabashi, supra note 48, at 66.
53. Id.
54. The nations of South Asia include India, Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh, Maldives,
Butan, and Sri Lanka.
55. Brad Glosserman, South Asia Awaits Japan, JAPAN TIMES, Dec. 18, 1991, at 23.
Masao Fujioka, former president of the Asian Development Bank [pointed out that]
'Japan's trade with South Asia amounted to only $29 billion during the period 1985-
1989, compared with $190 billion with ASEAN. Japan's investment to South Asia
amounted to only $200 million companies with $10 billion with ASEAN [sic].'
Id.
56. Peter Mackler, Asians Ambivalent About Japan 50 Years After War, MAINICHI DAILY
NBVS, Dec. 2, 1991, at 2.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. "The 24-year-old organization, comprising Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia,
the Philippines and Brunei, has a long-standing aim of building a Zone of Peace, Freedom and
Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in the region." Hiroko Kimura, ASEAN Nations Focus on Economic
Integration, JAPAN TIMEs, Nov. 2, 1991, at B1.
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ASEAN also foresees Japanese participation in its developing East
Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC).60 A Malaysian official has even stated
that Japan should play a leading role in EAEC.61 In the face of United
States opposition to EAEC, however, Japan has remained noncommitted
on its future participation. 6
A significant impetus for the members of ASEAN and the nations of
South Asia to create a free trade zone is concern that North American
and European investment resources and financial assistance previously
targeted for those Asian countries will be diverted to Eastern Europe and
the newly independent Soviet republics.' "As a result of the start of
these negotiations to set up NAFTA, a lot of concern was created in
Asian countries" regarding the locus of future investments, commented
Mr. Tanabe of M1T[.' Lower labor costs and improved access to the
United States and EC markets may mean that Eastern Europe and
Mexico will drain export investments from South and Southeast Asia.
This scenario, if true, could hasten efforts to create such an Asian free
trade zone.
Without a formal intergovernmental structure or coalition
comparable to the EC or NAFTA, the health of the Asian-Pacific nations'
economies is improving under Japanese leadership. Like the EC, over
60 percent of the Asian-Pacific nations' trade remains within the
region.' "Japan accounts for 66 percent of the GNP of all Asian
countries, including China and India, and Australia and New Zealand
combined .... ." If the United States, Canada, and Mexico attempt to
form a protectionist regional trade zone through NAFTA and the EC
moves in the same direction, Japan could justify pursuit of the same
protectionist goals in the Asian-Pacific region. More importantly, Japan
has the power to effectuate such a result, and it has already put in place
the corporate infrastructure to promote regional economic cooperation.
60. EAEC "will be a loose forum where participants can discuss economic issues of
common interest on an ad hoc basis." Takashi Kitazume, Gov't Faces Difficult Test of Regional
Commitment, JAPAN TIRES, Nov. 2, 1991, at B1. The concept of the EAEC is predicated on
"bringing together the fastest expanding economies of East Asia, among them Japan, South
Korea and Taiwan," with ASEAN nations. Kimura, supra note 59, at B1.
61. Thai Foreign Minister Arsa Sarasin said, "I think Japan ought to continue to play a
major role, giving assistance to less fortunate countries through bilateral relations and also
through international agencies." Kimura, supra note 59, at B1.
62. Kitazume, supra note 60, at B1.
63. Remarks by Mr. Howard Lewis, Vice President for International Economic Affairs, National
Association of Manufacturers, Fed. News Serv., Feb. 12, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
Omni File.
64. Terry, supra note 11, at B3.
65. Murray Weidenbaum, World Trade: Globalism Vs Regionalism, DAILY YOMIURI, Dec. 18,
1991, at 6.
66. Saburo Okita, Japan-U.S. Cooperation Is Essential, JAPAN TIMES, Jan. 7, 1992, at 21.
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. IV. CONCLUSION
Unsuccessful GATT negotiations at the Uruguay Round will, more
than likely, increase the momentum toward the creation of regional trade
blocs. The GATr provision that prohibits regional trade agreements
from imposing trade barriers against the rest of the world would have
little remaining significance As the imposition of trade barriers is no
longer a remote possibility, Japan must consider its options.
Direct investment in North America made to counter local content
requirements is currently being pursued. Farther down the road, Japan
may first try to turn APEC into a free trade area and to link APEC with
NAFTA to create a trans-Pacific trade bloc. If these measures fail and
NAFTA is extended to include the rest of Latin America, Japan may
strengthen its economic ties to the EAEC countries. It can be expected
that ASEAN countries will then be receptive to Japanese advances.
Most of these Asian countries, including Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Hong
Kong, and other Southeast Asian nations, are watching the EC and
NAFTA very closely to see if they become exclusive western nation
dubs. Southeast Asian nations fear that the EC and NAFTA will turn
protectionist and favor Eastern Europe and South America. Thus, they
have a vested interest in strengthening their economic ties with Japan.
Of all the Southeast Asian nations, however, only Japan is
economically strong enough to counter trading block barriers with direct
investment in EC and NAFTA member nations. As the economies of
Southeast Asian nations become more advanced and regional trade
becomes more active, an Asian intergovernmental trading structure or
free trade zone becomes more viable with Japan playing a predominant
role.
A western Pacific free trade zone, without the participation of the
United States, might pose problems for Japan because of lingering
political rivalries and historical antagonisms in Southeast Asia. If these
obstacles can be overcome, Japan would dominate the trade zone with
its overpowering economic strength; this would provide greater
incentives for the EC and NAFTA to tighten their regional trade blocks
to the exclusion of most Asian-Pacific nations. Unless the EC and
NAFTA specifically prohibit Japanese direct investment, the
development of trade zones will be countered by increased Japanese
investment within the EC and NAFTA member nations.' Under this
67. GATT, supra note 3, art. XXIV, 61 Stat. at A66, 55 U.N.T.S. at 268.
68. Japanese manufacturing and retail investments in Europe are increasing rapidly as
the EC trading community negotiates its permanent structure. In 1990, Japanese companies
carried out 440 mergers or acquisitions abroad, while foreign companies had made 18 such
deals in Japan. In 1990, Japanese investment in Europe totalled $14 billion, while European
investment in Japan reached only $1.3 billion. Beregovay (French Economic and Finance Minister)
Raps Japan's Trade Mentality, MAmnICHI DAILY NEwS, Jan. 16,1992, at 7. Similar investments are
Sprig 1992]
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scenario, Japan and its economy are the long-term beneficiaries of
regional trade zones.
taling place in Mexico and the United States under the threat of NAFrA.
To combat this investment trend, the United States and the EC have suggested an
anticircumvention rule that would undermine Japanese investments which shift manufacturing
facilities to the importing country or a third country with free trade status. This rule is similar
to the one contained in the EC-Japan agreement and prevents Japanese automobile
manufacturers from selling large quantities of cars imported or made locally where markets are
protected by quotas. Special Tradeoff Said Reached Between France, Nissan and Toyota, MAINICHI
DAILY NEWS, Jan. 26, 1992, at 11.
Anticircumvention rules protect domestic companies that have shifted their manufacturing
operations overseas and are importing and selling their products domestically. They may also
protect domestic companies which sell products manufactured abroad under the domestic
companies' names as part of original equipment manufacturing arrangements. These rules will
likely hurt foreign capital-affiliated corporations that are creating jobs in the importing country
and carrying on a good share of the production in the importing country. Hajime Ohta,
Administering the Correct Medicine?, JAPAN TIMES, Dec. 2, 1991, at 10.
